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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although regulations often have no direct fiscal impact, they 
pose real costs to consumers as well as businesses. Regulations 
aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment alone 
cost over two hundred  billion dollars annually-about two- 
thirds as much as outlays for federal, nondefense discretionary 
programs?  Yet,  the economic impacts of federal regulation 
*  Mr.  Hahn  is  director  of the  AEI-Brookings Joint  Center  for  Regulatory 
Studies.  Mr.  Burnett,  Ms.  Mader,  and Ms.  Moyle are  researchers  at ~e AEI- 
B  r~kings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Ms. Chan was a researcher at the 
Joint  Center  when. this  work  was  undertaken.  The  authors  gratefully 
acknowledge  the assistance of Paul Tetlock, Tats Kanenari, and Amy ~Vendhoft 
~d the comments of Randall Lutter.  The views expressed in this paper  reflect 
ose of the authors  and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with 
which they are affihated. 
1.  See  KENNETH J.  ARROW El"  AL.,  BEN~a.H-COST ANALYSIS IN  ENVIRONMENTAL, 
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION:  A  STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES vii (1996); 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT  & BUDGET, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS  ON THE COSTS 
AND  BENEFITS  OF  FEDERAL  REGULAT/ONS  4  (1999). 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov./omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pd  f>.  All 
dollar  figu~s are  presented  as  constant  1999 dollars,  adjusted  by  using the 
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receive much less scrutiny than the budget.  2 
To encourage the development of more effective and efficient 
regulations,  Presidents  Reagan,  Bush,  and  Clinton  have 
directed  agencies  to  perform  economic  analyses  of  major 
regulations that show whether a regulation's benefits are likely 
to exceed its costs and whether alternatives to that regulation 
are more effective or less costly.  Each president also attempted 
to  increase agency accountability for decisions by requiring 
that  the  President's  Office  of  Management  and  Budget 
("OMB") review all major regulations.  More recently, Congress 
embraced  regulatory  reform  and  inserted  accountability 
provisions  3 and analytical requirements into laws such as the 
Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  Amendments  of  1996,  the  Small 
Business  Enforcement  and  Fairness  Act  of  1996,  and  the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.  4 
The  most prominent and  far-reaching of these regulatory 
reform efforts are President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 
and President Clinton's Executive Order 12,286.  Both require 
agencies to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis ("RIA")  for 
all major federal regulations,  s  Agencies have prepared RIAs 
for  almost  twenty  years  in  accordance  with  the  executive 
orders and guidelines for economic analysis provided by the 
OMB. 6 
2.  See  JOINT ECONOMIC COMMIIJ.~  STUDY, TRENDS IN  CONGRESSIONAL 
APPROPRIATIONS: FISC.ALRwtKAINTINTHE1990S8  tbl3 (1998). 
3.  Some examples of accountability mechanisms include regulatory oversight, 
peer  review,  judicial  review,  sunset  provisions,  regulatory  budgets,  end 
requirements to provade better information to Congress. 
4.  Analytical requirements  include  mandates  to balance  costs end benefits, 
consider  risk-risk  tradeoffs,  and  evaluate  the  cost-effectiveness  of  different 
regulatory  alternatives.  See  Robert  W.  Hahn,  The  Impact  of Economics  on 
Environmental  Policy,  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  ECONOMICS  AND 
MANAGEMENT  (forthcoming). 
5.  President  Reagan coined  the  ~u,, regulatory  impact  analysis  in Executive 
Order 12,291, see 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981). President Bush also used Executive Order 
12,2e/1. President  Clinton's  Executive Order  12,866 changed  the  term regulatory 
impact  analysis  to  assessment,  see 3 C.F.R. 638  0993).  Executive Order  12,866 
maintains  most  of  Reagen's  requirements,  but  places  greater  emphasis  on 
distributional concerns.  Executive Order 12866 also directs agencies to show that 
the  benefits of the  regulation  "justify" the  costs,  whereas Reagan's Executive 
Order required agencies to show that the benefits of the regulation'  outweigh" the 
costs.  See  Exec. Order  No.  12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981-1993); Exec. Order  No. 
12"866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted in 5 US.C. § 601 (1994). 
6.  SeeOfficeofManagement&Budget,EconomicAnalysi~ofFederalRegulations 
under  Executive  Order  12,866  (last  modified  Jan.  11,  1996) 
<http.//wwwwhitehousegov/omb/inforeg/riaguidehtml>  [hereinafter  OM8 
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This Article suggests that the impact of RIAs has fallen short 
of  the  expectations  of  regulatory  reform  advocates  in  part 
because agencies do not fully comply with OMB's guidelines. 7 
The  RIAs  typically  do  not  provide  enough  information  to 
enable  regulatory  agencies  to  make  decisions  that  will 
maximize the efficiency or effectiveness of a rule.  8 
This conclusion is based  on the results of an evaluation  of 
forty-eight major environmental, health, and safety regulations 
and  their  associated  RIAs.  9  The  authors  completed  a 
"regulatory scorecard" for each of the forty-eight  regulations, 
which  includes  a  checklist  of  the  requirements  for  a  good 
economic  analysis  outlined  in  the  Executive  Order  and  the 
OMB guidelines. 1° The study of RIAs shows that agencies only 
quantified  net benefits-the  dollar value of expected  benefits 
minus expected  costs-for  29 percent  of the forty-eight  rules, 
even though the Executive Order directs agencies to show that 
the benefits  of a regulation "justify" the costs,  n  The agencies 
7.  Others have reviewed the quality of RIAs, but to our knowledge no one has 
evaluated  the  impact  on  the  regulatory  process.  See.  • g,  Robert  W.  Hahn, 
Regulatory  Reform:  What do the Government's  Numbers  Tell Us?, m RISKS, COSTS, AND 
LIVES  SAVED. GETriNG B~I liar RESUL1~3  FROM REGULATION  208, 240-41 (Robert W. 
Hahn ed., 1996); Richard D. Mor~enstern  & Marc K. Landy, Economw AnalyMs: 
Benefits.  Costs.  Implications,  in  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS AT  EPA:  A,~'E~ING 
REGULATORY IMPACT 455, 463-74 (Richard  D. Morgenstern  ed,  1997); see also 
KENNEITI J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST  ANALYSIS  IN ENVIRONMENTAL,  HEALTH, 
AND SAFETY  REGULATION. A STATEMENT  OF PRINCIYI.ES  vii (1996). 
8.  Economists  frequently  measure  the  "economlc  efficiency"  of a  policy  in 
relays  of its impact on producers  and  consumers.  In theory,  this is done  by 
esthnating  appropriate  areas  under  demand  and  suP]DlY curves.  There  are 
different measures used for effectiveness.  One measure is how closely a  policy 
achieves a goal.  Another measure economists frequently use is the average cost or 
marginal costs of achieving a specific goal. 
9.  While  the  definition  of  major  has  changed  somewhat  over  times,  it  is 
currently  defined  as a  rule  that  is expected  to  "have an annual  effect on  the 
economy  of $100 million or  more  or  adversely  affect  in  a  material  way  the 
economy,  a  sector  of  the  economy,  productivity,  competition,  jobs,  the 
environment,,,public  health  or safety,  or State,  local, or tribal governments  or 
communities.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted  m 5 
u.s.~ § 601 (1994}. 
10. The dataset  includes regulations  from April 1996 through July 1999.  A 
complete  llst  of  the  regulations  is  provided  in  Appendix  2.  Additional 
information  is  available  at  the  JoInt  Center  website  at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org,  including links to the full text of the rules,  the 
RIA when available, and the data used in this paper.  The Joint Center undertook 
this study  as  the first phase  of a  project,  termed  the Joint Center  Regulatory 
Improvement  Project,  designed  to  enhance  regulatory  accountability  and 
transparency by making information about regulations more readily available on 
the Internet.  This project will both provide information both  on the quality of 
recent RIAs and  other regulatory analyses  through  summary  information  and 
links to other on-lIne sources of regulatory information. 
11.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. 862  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
also did not adequately evaluate alternatives to the proposed 
regulation, another element of the Executive Order.  Agencies 
failed  to  discuss  alternatives  for 27  percent  of the rules  and 
quantified  the  costs  and benefits  of  alternatives  for  only  31 
percent.  In addition, the agencies  often failed to  present  the 
results of their analysis clearly.  Agencies provided  executive 
summaries for only 56 percent of the rules. 
This Article also offers specific suggestions for improving the 
quality of RIAs, which will in turn improve the allocation of 
regulatory  resources.  These  include:  (1)  the  use  of  clear 
executive  summaries;  (2)  the  provision  of  on-line  RIAs;  (3) 
improved  evaluation  of  regulatory  alternatives;  and  (4) 
improved assessment of net benefits. 
Part II of the paper describes the methodology of the study. 
Part III  presents  the results.  Part IV describes  in  detail  the 
policy recommendations to improve RIAs. 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
This study builds on previous efforts to evaluate the quality 
of RIAs.  TM  Whereas previous studies evaluated a few RIAs in 
great detail, this study assesses the quality of forty-eight RIAs 
published from April 1996  to July 199973  This approach is 
12. For a review of several economic analyses, see ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  AT EPA: 
ASS~SING  REGULATORY  IMPACT  (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); Arthur Fraas, 
The Role of  Economic  Analysts  m Shaping Environmental  Policy,  54 LAW & CoMrEMP. 
PRO~S.  113  0991); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  AGENCY, EPA's  USE  OF  BI~II- 
COST ANALYSIS 1981-1986  (1986); RESOURCES COMMUNITY  AND  ECONOMIC 
DEVELOFMENT DIVISION,  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICF,  COST-BEN~r[ ANALYSIS 
CAN  BE  US~%~IL  IN  ASS]~SING  ENVIRONMENTAL  I~GULATIONS,  DI~PIII~ 
LIMITATIONS,  (1984). For a review of the regulatory oversight process, see KERRY 
V. SMH'H, ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY UNDER REAGAN'S F2(F.CI/IT¢~  ORDER:  THE 
Rtn.E OF BENEFrr-C_O~  ANALYSIS  (1984). 
13. The authors obtained from OMB a list  of all the rules that OMB reviewed in 
the past four years.  From that list, they eliminated  all t~ansfer rules and rules 
without an economic analysis.  They then  selected the economically significant 
rules that were finalized between the beginning of April 1996 and the end of July 
1999. The criteria used for including a rule in our database are similar to OMB's 
criteria  for  major  "Environmental"  and  "Other  Social" rules.  See  OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT  & BUDGET,  1998 REPORT  TO CONGI~  ON THE COSTS  AND BENP.PI  1~ 
OF FEDERAL  REGULATIONS,  10-11 0999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
infureg/co6tbenefih'eport1998.pdf>.  In several  cases,  an  agency  finalized  an 
economically significant rule but did not produce  an economic analysis because 
Congress  prohibited  funding the  analysis.  See,  eg.,  Appropriations  2000- 
Department of Transportation end Related Agencies, Pub. I.. No. 106-96 § 321,113 
Star 986, 1019 (1999) (preventing funds from being used to "prepare, promote or 
promulgate any regulations.., prescribing corporate fuel economy standards  for 
automobdes  ).  See generally Average FuelEconomy Standards, 49 U.S.C_  § 32,902 
(1994). The authors  excluded those rules from our database because no analysis No. 3].  Assessing  Regulatory Impact Analyses  863 
advantageous  because  it  is  possible  to  identify  common 
strengths and weaknesses among many RIAs, a  task that no 
previous study has undertaken. 
The  authors  included  only  major  rules,  also  known  as 
Ueconomically significant"  rules,  in  the  study  because  they 
typically have annual costs or benefits in excess of one hundred 
million dollars per year.  These rules have the largest impact on 
society and agencies should scrutinize them more than other 
rules.14  Also, with a few exceptions, agencies produce RIAs for 
all major rules.  The study excludes so-cailed "transfer" rules, 
or  rules  designed  to  move  resources  from  the  federal 
government to designated segments of the population, because 
agencies  generally  do  not  assess the  costs  and  ben,,efits  of 
transfer rules.  TM  The study only includes "non-transfer' rules, 
which are  rules  that  address  market  failures  and  focus  on 
achieving regulatory objectives, such as improving air quality. 
The study further assumes that agency numbers presented in 
RIAs are accurate and complete.  This approach allows third 
parties  to  easily reproduce  the study's results. At the same 
time, this approach precludes critical evaluation of the agency 
estimates, which  other  authors  suggest are  often biased  in 
support of the regulation or  are compromised by  analytical 
flaws./6 
The study examines the extent to which agency RIAs meet 
the  government's own  standards  for  economic  analysis, as 
described in the Executive Order  and the OMB guidelines.  17 
The Executive Order  states, for example, that agencies shall 
provide "an assessment, including the underlying analysis," of 
was available. 
14. Presidents  Reagan  and  Clinton  recognized  the  importance  of  careful 
analysis  of economically significant  rules  when they  issued  Executive Orders 
12,291 and 12,866, respectively.  See generally Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 
(1981-1993); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 (19o,4). 
15. According to OMB, a transfer occurs when wealth or income is redistributed 
without any direct change in aggregate social welfare.  See Office of Management 
& Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs  and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 
65 Fed. Reg. 7198.-01 (2000) <http://www.whitehouss.gov/omb/inforeg] 
3stevensdr~pdt'>. 
16.  See,  e.g.,  ~URCES FOR THE  FUTURF# ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: 
ASSESSING  REGULATORY  IMPACT  (Richard D. Morganstern ed., 1997). 
17. Section 4(F)(7)(d) of the  Executive Order  requires  the  OMB  to  provide 
agencies guidance  in writing economic analyses.  See  3 C.F.R. 638, 643 (1993- 
2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). The OMB convened an interagency group 
to describe the best Fracticee for preparing economic analyses. The results of that 
effort were presented in a paper in January 1996. See OMB Guutelin~,  supra note 8. 864  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
benefits  and  costs  expected  from  a  regulation  and,  "to  the 
extent feasible," provide a quantification  of those benefits and 
costs.  TM  The OMB Guidelines further direct agencies to express 
benefits  and  costs  in  monetary  terms  "to  the  fullest  extent 
possible. "19  The  Executive  Order  also  states  that  "agencies 
should  assess  all  costs  and  benefits  of  available  regulato,,r~ 
alternatives,  including  the  alternative  of  not  regulating. "~ 
According  to  the  Executive  Order,  the  RIA  must  provide 
sufficient  information  to  demonstrate  that  the  agency  is 
selecting the regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits, 
unless  the  approach  is  prohibited  by  statute?  a  The  OMB 
Guidelines  further  provide  agencies  with  a  recommended 
approach for evaluating alternatives. ~' 
The authors  developed  a  "regulatory  scorecard,"  based  on 
the Executive Order and the OMB Guidelines, summarized in 
the Appendix.  Each item listed on the scorecard represents an 
essential element of a good economic analysis.  The researcher 
evaluating  the  RIA  filled  out  the  scorecard  based  on  an 
evaluation  of  the Federal Register notice,  the agency's  formal 
description of the rule that is available to the public, and the 
RIA.  z~  Another  researcher  then  would  validate  the  first 
18. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 3 C_F.R. 638, 645 (1993).  It is arguably 
not always possible or desirable  to monetize all benefits and costs.  See Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39; OM8 Gu~delinea, supra note 8. 
19. OMB Cmtdehnea, supra  note 8. The OMB Guidelines  discuss  principles  for 
putting an explicit  value on  benefits  that  are  difficult  to  monetize,  such  as 
environmental  amenities.  See also Exec. Order  No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, (1993); 
Unfunded Mandates  Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. II 1996) (requiring  an 
economic analysis that includes a quantification of impacts and consideration  of 
alternatives). 
20. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § l(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39 (1993). 
21. The Executive Order  states that "agencies should  select those  approaches 
that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental,  public 
health  and  safety,  and  other  advantages;  dlstlibutional  impacts;  and  equity), 
unless a statute requires another regulatory approach."  Id. 
22. The OMB Guidelines urge agencies to define carefully the proper  baseline, 
discuss uncertainty and bias in esl~nates, and carefully descri~ key assumptions 
used in developing estimates of benefits and costs.  See OMB Guidelines,  supra note 
8. 
Although a~,ncies ma.y present reasons not to quantify and monetize benefits 
and costs, and not consider  alternatives  for individual regulations,  we believe 
th~  should be able  to  meet  the  requirements  of the  Executive Order  for  a 
majority  of regulations.  The authors  recognize that quantification  of costs  and 
benefits may prove difficult in some cases and that a qualitative measure  may 
prove valuable.  Some of those cases appear in the OMB Guidelines.  See id. 
23. Whenever  a  discrepancy  existed  between  the  numbers  presented  in the 
Federal Register  and the  KIA, the  authors  used  the data  that appeared  in the 
Federal Register  because it is the official  publication for agency documents. No. 3]  Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses  865 
researcher's findings by reviewing the same documents.  If the 
findings of  the  two  researchers  differed  for  any  part  of  the 
scorecard,  the  researchers  resolved  the  differences  by 
discussion. 
Generally, there was little disagreement between researchers 
because completing the scorecard did not require researchers to 
subjectively assess the agency's compliance with the Executive 
Order  and  the OMB  Guidelines.  24  Determining whether  the 
agency "discussed alternatives," for example, is relatively easy 
because  an  agency  must  simply  mention  the  existence  of 
alternative  regulatory  approaches.  ~  The  most  prominent 
exception  is  the  scorecard  item  that  measures  whether  the 
agency  "considered  the  most  important  alternative 
approaches" to the regulation.  ~  Although this is an important 
component of a  good economic analysis, the authors did not 
include it in the summary presented in this Article because of 
concerns about subjectivity." 
HI.  RESULTS 
This  Part  describes  the  aggregate results  of  our  study  of 
agencies' economic analyses.  In general, we find  that most 
economic analyses do not meet the expectations set forth in the 
Executive Order  and  the  OMB  Guidelines, and  a  significant 
percentage  clearly  violate  them.  Specifically,  agencies 
frequently  do  not  provide  the  kind  of  information  in  the 
analyses necessary to select the best regulatory alternative or to 
show that the agency should proceed with the regulation.  . 
This Part breaks the discussion of the results of the study into 
the  following categories:  estimation of  costs,  estimation of 
benefits,  comparison  of  benefits  and  costs,  evaluation  of 
alternatives,  clarity  of  presentation,  and  consistent  use  of 
analytical assumptions.  It then  discusses conclusions arising 
24. Given the complexity of the RIAs, the researchers may have made some 
errors when completing the scorecards.  The authors welcome cor~ctions. Please 
submit  any  comments  to  us  through  our  web  site  at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org. 
25. In EPA's "Federal Te~t Procedure Revisions"  rule, for example, the agency 
did not discuss alternatives,  except to claim the option selected "is the most cost- 
effective alternative currently available  and to refer the reader to a discussion 
elsewhere. Motor Vehicles  Emissions Federal Test Procedure Revisions,  61 Fed. 
Reg 54,851,  54,877 (1996). This rule was scored as considerin  8 alternatives. 
26. OMB Guideline3,  supra note 8. 
27. For more information regardingthe definition of scorecard items, please 
visit our on-line database at www.aal.brookings.org. J 
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from the analysis. Three agencies have finalized more than five 
rules  included  in  the  database:  the  Department  of 
Transportation ("DOT"),  the Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA"), and the Department of Health and Human Services 
("HHS").  This study presents the results from these agencies 
separately and grouped results from the remaining agencies 
together,  simply  because  no  other  single  agency  finalized 
enough rules for meaningful summary statistics.  ~ 
The reader needs to interpret the statistics presented in this 
section with care.  Some agencies noted, for  example,  that 
regulations have costs in addition to direct compliance costs 
and administrative costs.  It would be misleading to suggest 
that these agencies performed a lower quality analysis simply 
because they noted the existence of some indirect costs of the 
regulations, but did not attempt to quantify them.  In fact, the 
acknowledgment of indirect costs is arguably an indication of a 
more thorough analysis on the part of agencies. 
A.  Estimation  of Costs 
Comprehensive estimates of regulatory costs allow decision 
makers  to  compare regulatory  alternatives  and  identify the 
impact  of  a  regulation  on  different  groups  to  address 
distributional concerns.  We found that agencies could present 
the results of their cost analyses more clearly and identify the 
impact on different groups more frequently, but in general, 
agencies attempt to evaluate the costs of regulation. 
Agencies always define categories of costs associated with a 
proposed regulation and usually, quantify some part of those 
costs.  Approximately 95  percent of the economic analyses 
quantified some costs, and 90  percent of economic analyses 
monetized some costs.  29  Figure 1 shows that DOT, EPA, and 
HI-IS monetized costs in over 80  percent of their respective 
rules. 
28.  The  other  agencies  include  the  Department  of  Commerce  (DOC),  the 
Department  of  F.ner~  (DOE),  the  Department  of  Labor  (DOL),  end  the 
Department  of Agriculture (USDA). 
29.  By "monetized ~ we mean that an agency put a dollar value on at least some 
part of the relevant category, such as costs or benefits. No. 3]  Assessing  Regulatory Impact Analyses 
Figure 1: Agency Analysis of Monetized Costs 
867 
All  DOT  EPA  HHS 
(n,=46)  (n=6)  (n=22)  (n-~) 
Agencies" 
=n  Presented  no  estimate of  monctJzcd co~ts 
c3 Pres~ted only a range of monetlzed costs 
m Presented only a best e~mma~ of monetlzcd costs 
m Pn~m~t both a range and a b~t csumaic of monetized cos~ 
• DOT--Department  of Transportation. EPA--Environmental  Protection 
Agency.  HI-IS-Health  end  Human  Services. IX)C-Department  of 
Commerce.  DOE-Department of  Energy.  DOL-Department of  Labor. 
USDA-Department of Agriculture. The category "Other"  includes  DOC, 
DOE, DOL, and USDA. 
The other agencies monetized some costs for only about one- 
half of the remaining rules.  Agencies monetized all stated costs 
in only 63 percent of the rules. 
Figure I  also shows that agencies presented a "best estimate" 
of monetized costs far more often than they presented an actual 
range.  Over two-thirds of the regulations gave a best estimate 
of  costs,  while  only  one-fourth  presented  a  range  of  cost 
estimates.  Only 13 percent of the regulations presented both a 
best estimate and a range of costs. 
An  improved  understanding  of  the  impact  of  regulatory 
costs  on  different  groups  allows  policymakers  to  address 
distributional concerns more effectively. The study considers 
whether  an  economic  analysis  associated  costs  with  the 
following groups: producers, nonfederal governments, and the 868  Harvard Journal of  l,  mv& Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
federal  government.  3°  Almost  all  economic  analyses  (94 
percent) note that a regulation will impose compliance costs on 
producers.  A third of the analyses identify costs to nonfederal 
governments,  while  about  one-quarter  of  the  regulations 
identify federal budgetary costs.  Regulations impose costs on 
these  groups  both  directly  and  indirectly,  and  agencies 
routinely  identify  and  quantify  some  of  these  costs.  For 
example,  over  two-thirds  of  the  analyses  note  that  the 
regulation will have administrative costs)  z  In contrast,  the 
agencies rarely discuss and never quantify the macroeconomic 
impacts of regulations in their economic analyses. 
B.  Estimation of  Benefits 
Similar  to cost estimates, benefit estimates allow  decision 
makers  to  compare regulatory  alternatives and  identify the 
groups that benefit from a regulation.  We found that agencies 
were  less likely  to  quantify  benefits than  costs,  and  rarely 
monetized  benefits.  Moreover,  agencies  generally  did  not 
present  a  range  to  represent  uncertainties  associated  with 
benefits. Such evidence suggests that agencies can significantly 
improve their analyses of regulatory benefits. 
Almost  all  of  the  regulations  (96  percent)  identified 
benefits.  32 The two rules that did not explicitly address benefits 
were designed to reduce the costs of existing regulations.  Of 
those  rules  that  listed  benefits,  approximately  70  percent 
described benefits in quantitative terms, either as a range or a 
best estimate.  Only 17 percent of the rules presented both a 
best estimate and a range of those quantitative benefits. 
Figure  2  provides  information  on  the  extent  to  which 
agencies monetized any benefits.  Agencies converted benefits 
into  dollar  equivalents  in  less than  one-half of  regulations 
examined.  Rarely did agencies give best estimates and ranges 
:.30. A]~ough these categories are useful, it is not a simple matter to estimate the 
ultimate impact of costs on consumers  and workers.  Indeed, the data px~sented 
generally do not permit an asse~ment of the impact of regulations on consumers, 
workers, and owners of capital. 
31. The Paperwork Reduction Act requires agencies to estimate the "vaverwork 
burden" imposed by regulations.  See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.~.~, § 3504 
(Supp. II 1996). 
32.  In addition to benefits, agencies often include cost siwings sa a category of 
regulatory impa.cts. The difference between cost savings end benefits is more a 
matter of semantics than economics, but we  separated cost savings and benefits if 
the agency separated them. No. 3]  Assessing  Regulatory Impact Analyses  869 
for monetized benefits.  DOT and EPA are the only agencies 
that  monetized benefits with at  least 50  percent frequency. 
DOT presented monetized benefits for two-thirds of their rules, 
while  HHS  only  monetized  benefits  in  one-third  of  their 
analyses. 






0%  [ 
HHS  (n-~) 
All  DOT  EPA  Other 
(~46)  (n~6)  (n,-22)  (n--~) 
Ageades" 
I~ Presented no eedmate of monetized benefits 
Presented only a range of monetlzed benefits 
m Pre~m~d only a best e~mate of monetized benefits 
m Preumted both a range and a best estm-atte  of monedzed benefits 
• DOT-Department  of Transportation.  EPA-Environmantal  Protection 
Agency.  HHS-Health  and  Human  Services.  DOC-Department  of 
Commerce.  DOE-Department  of  Energy.  DOL-Department  of  Labor. 
USDA-Department  of Agriculture.  The category  "Other"  includes  DOC, 
DOE, DOL, and USDA. In two rules the agencies do not expect any benefits. 
These rules are excluded from this analysis. 
Often  agencies  quantify  and  monetize  only  some  of  the 
explicitly stated benefits.  Agencies quantified all of the stated 
benefits for 54 percent of the rules and monetized all benefits in 
only 28 percent of the rules.  Determining whether the benefits 
that  agencies  chose  not  to  quantify  represent  a  significant 
portion  of the  total  benefits was  beyond  the  scope  of this 870  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
analysis, although it is an important issue. 
Also, agencies monetized certain categories of benefits more 
frequently than other categories.  For example, in 83 percent of 
the  rules  for  which  agencies  identified  safety  benefits,  the 
agency presented a  monetized estimate of those benefits.  In 
contrast, agencies monetized benefits for only 54 percent of the 
rules that identified health benefits.  Perhaps most starkly, in 
only 11 percent of rules for which agencies identify benefits 
from pollution reductions did  the agency actually  monetize 
those benefits.  ~ 
C. Comparing Costs and Benefits 
A  comparison of costs and  benefits of a  regulation helps 
decision  makers  compare  a  specific  regulation  to  other 
proposed or existing regulations. Without such a comparison, 
decision makers cannot know whether a regulation is the best 
use of available resources. We found that agencies routinely 
failed  to  compare  their  estimates of the  costs  and  benefits, 
using  either  net  benefits  estimates  or  cost-effectiveness 
estimates. 
Figure 3  reveals that only 28 percent of the rules present 
information  on  net  benefits,  a  key  indicator  of  economic 
efficiency.  Of those, about one-third presented best estimates, 
while the other two-thirds presented a range.  Only two rules 
presented both a range and best estimate of net benefits, u 
33. Most of  the monetized  benefits  from pollution  reduction are due to  lower 
morbidity and mortality  rates.  The study includes  pollution  reduction benefits  as 
a separate category  because a substantial  fraction  of the rules in our database (44 
percent) were expected to reduce pollution 
34.  See Finding of Significant  Contributaon  and Rulemaking for Certain States 
in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group  Region  for Purposes  of Reducing 
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (to be codified  at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
72, 75, 96); Energy Conservation  Program for Consumer Products: Final Rule 
~..3.3rding Energy Conservation  Standards for Room Air Conditioners,  10 C.F.R. § 
2 (1998) No. 3]  Assessing  Regulatory Impact Analyses 
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m l~sented no estimate of monetized net benefits 
Predated only a range o f monetized net benefits 
m Pres~tsd only a best esUmate  of monetized net benefits 
at Presented both a range and a best esumate of  monedzed net benefits 
• DOT--Department  of Transportation.  EPA-Environmental  Protection 
Agency.  HHS-Health  and  Human  Services.  DOC-Department  of 
Commerce.  DOE-Department  of  Energy.  DOL-Department  of  Labor. 
USDA-Department  of Agriculture.  The  category  "Other"  includes  DOC, 
DOE, DOL, and USDA. 
Of the three agencies that promulgated more than five rules, 
HI-IS and EPA presented net benefits most often, while DOT 
never  presented  net  benefits.  Also,  agencies  tended  to 
" monetize  costs  more  frequently  than  benefits.  3s  Agencies 
monetized costs for 60 percent of the rules in the database, 
monetized  all  benefits  for  49  percent  of  the  rules,  and 
monetized all costs and benefits for only 19 percent of rules. 
Agencies failed to calculate net benefits for nearly half of the 
regulations  with  monetized  figures  for  unclear  reasons. 
Sometimes  the  agency  provided  enough  information  to 
calculate net benefits but did not perform the calculation, even 
though the calculation only requires the agency to subtract one 
35. Tlus  finding  is  consistent  with  previous  studies.  See  generally  HAHN, 
~ING  THE GOVERNMENT'S  NUMBERS, supra note 6. 872  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
estimate  from  the  other  estimate.  One  possibility  is  that 
agencies  do  not  feel  that  the  cost  or  benefit  estimates are 
reasonable.  ~  Thus, the difference between the two estimates 
would not provide a meaningful estimate of net benefits. 
Another possibility is that agencies are reluctant to present 
net benefit estimates if those estimates are negative.  In the 
database,  of the  thirty-one rules  that  provided  estimates of 
costs  and  benefits  sufficient  to  calculate  net  benefits,  only 
one-half had benefits and costs savings that exceeded the costs. 
The study further separates the thirty-one rules with benefit 
and cost estimates into rules for which the agency presented 
net  benefits  (twelve)  and  those  where  the  agency  did  not 
(nineteen).  In the first group, where the agency presented net 
benefits, thrce quarters pass a benefit-cost test.  In the second 
group, only one-third pass the same benefit-cost test.  These 
results lend some support to the view that agencies present net 
benefits  numbers  more  frequently  when  those  numbers 
support  their  regulation  while  agencies  tend  to  omit  net 
benefits when the result would be negative. 
Sometimes  agencies  present  cost-effectiveness  numbers, 
either in addition to or instead of information on net benefits. 
The agency calculated cost-effectiveness by dividing monetized 
costs by some nonmonetary quantitative measure of benefits.  37 
The cost-effectiveness calculation allows the agency to describe 
the  effectiveness  of  a  regulation  relative  to  alternative 
regulatory approaches without assigning an actual monetary 
value to quantified benefits. 
Figure 4 shows that agencies presented an estimate of cost- 
effectiveness for  only  one-third  of  the  rules  for  which  the 
agency did  not provide  an  estimate of net  benefits.  Thus, 
approximately  half  (48  percent)  of  the  forty-eight  rules 
examined in this Article provided no direct  measures of net 
benefits or indirect measures based on cost-effectiveness. Only 
6 percent of the forty-eight rules provided both an estimate of 
net  benefits  and  an  estimate  of  cost-effectiveness.  ~  This 
36.  DOT does not present net benefits if it believes the benefit or cost numbers 
are not sufficiently robust.  See Telephone Interview by Jason Burnett with the 
general counsel s  office, U.S. Department  of Transportation,  Washington,  D.C. 
(oct 20,1999). 
37.  A  cost-effectiveness  measure  works  best  when  the  rule  has  only  one 
expected benefit. If the agency expects multiple benefits, it is difficult to sum such 
benefits to generate the denominator in the cost-effectiveness calculation. 
38.  This estimate could be a best estimate, a range, or beth. J 
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finding  is  important  because  cost-effectiveness  calculations 
may  be  particularly  useful  when  benefits  axe  difficult  to 
monetize or when agencies are simply reluctant to monetize 
them. 
Figure 4: Agency Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness 
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Presented no estimate of  cost-effectivene~ 
presented only a range of  cost-effectiveness 
m Presented only a best estimate  of  cost-effectiveness 
m Presented beth a range and a best estimate of  cost-effecttveness 
'DOT--DeparUnent of  Transportation.  EPA--Envlronmental Protection 
Agency.  HHS--Health and Human Services.  DOC--Department of Commerce. 
DOE--DeparUnemofEnergy.  DOL--Department of  Labor.  USDA-- 
Department of  Agficultme. The category "Other" includes DOC, DOE, DOL, 
and USDA. 
~Figure  4  also  reveals  the  extent  to  which  the  cost- 
effectiveness information varies  by  agency.  EPA  presented 
cost-effectiveness information for about half of the rules where 
it did not present net benefit numbers.  DOT is the only other 
agency that provided any information on cost-effectiveness for 
rules in which net benefit information was not supplied.  By 
presenting cost-effectiveness numbers, agencies  avoided  the 874  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
tasks  of  assigning a  dollar  value  to  estimates of  pollution 
abatement and of assigning a  monetary value to extending a 
human life• 
Often,  agencies  do  not  present  the  results  from  cost- 
effectiveness  calculations  in  an  appropriate  manner.  For 
regulations designed to reduce several types of pollution, EPA 
often lumped all pollutants together in its calculation of cost- 
effectiveness?  9  Depending on the composition of pollutants 
reduced by the rule, that approach will  either exaggerate or 
understate the costs relative to a  net benefit calculation.  On 
other  occasions,  EPA  calculated  the  cost-effectiveness  of 
reducing a single pollutant while ignoring the other benefits of 
the regulation.  4°  This approach overstates the true cost that 
should be attributed to each ton abated. 
D.  Discussion  of  Alternatives 
The  Executive  Order  and  the  OMB  Guidelines  direct 
agencies  to  ensure  that  the  regulatory  alternative  chosen 
maximizes net benefits.  41  Unfortunately, the agencies generally 
did not provide a  significant analysis of alternatives in RIAs, 
even when the agencies conducted a  quantitative analysis of 
their preferred option. ~ 
Figure  5  shows  the  extent  to  which  different  agencies 
analyzed  alternatives.  Although  agencies  discussed 
alternatives  in  over  two-thirds  of  the  rules  examined, they 
quantified  the  costs  and  benefits  of  alternatives  in  only  a 
quarter of these rules.  The three agencies with more than five 
rules in our database (DOT, EPA, and HI-IS) quantified benefits 
39.  This aggregation may be more useful when using a weighted average_  For 
example,  DOT provides cost-effectlveness  estimates for several of its regulations 
~mbining,  ~uries and deaths by employing a weighting system.  See, e.g., 
peune Satety  Standards, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,770 (1996). 
• .40.  EPA did not include direct  hydrocarbon and particulate  matter reductions 
..m  its  calculation  of cost-effecfiveness  of oxides of nitrogen emission reduction in 
Its  rule  governing locomotive emissions. See Emission S"tsndards  for  Locomotives 
end Locomotive Engines, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,978 (1998)  (to  be codified at  40 C,.F.R.  pts. 
85,  89,  92). 
41.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted  in 5 U.S.C- § 
601 (1994); OMB Guidelines, supra note 11. 
42.  For 35 percent of the rules,  agencies presented  estimates of benefits end 
costs for the chosen alternative but failed to present such estimates for other 
alter  .n,2....  lives. H agencies can quan.'tffy  costs  and benefits  for  the chosen alternative, 
they.  likely  should be able to  quanlLfy benefits  end costs  of  relevant alternatives  as 
wen., So do.rag would presumably not require significant  new information or 
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and  costs of alternatives in  approximately 20  percent  to  35 
percent of their analyses.  No other agency quantified benefits 
and costs of alternatives for any of its rules.  Only two rules out 
of  forty-eight  calculated  incremental  net  benefits  of  the 
alternatives.  ~  This incomplete consideration  of alternatives 
makes it difficult to assess whether alternatives would actually 
be  superior  to  an  agency's preferred  policy,  even using an 
agency's own assessment. 





0%  All  DOT  EPA  HHS  Other 
(n=48)  (n  =6)  (re=23)  (n=10)  (n=9) 
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• DOT--Department of Transportation.  EPA--Environmental  Protection 
Agency.  HHS--Health  and  Human  Services.  DOC--Department  of 
Commerce.  DOE--Departmant  of Energy.  DOL--Depar~ent  of Labor. 
USDA--Depart~ant  of Agriculture.  The category "Other" includes DOC, 
DOE, DOL, and USDA. 
43.  Both  are  EPA  rules.  See  Findings  of  Sisni~cant  Contribution  and 
RuJemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region 
for Purposes of Reducing Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (to be 
codified  at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, YS, 96); Regional  Haze Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714 
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E.  Clarity of  Presentation 
RIAs are not transparent, in part because the results are not 
reported  clearly  and  consistently.  Improving  the  clarity  of 
presentation in RIAs would help stakeholders understand the 
impact of regulations. Agencies provided completely consistent 
benefit numbers between the Federal Register and their RIA for 
less than 60 percent of the rules.  ~  Only about one-half of the 
RIAs  contained  an  executive  summary.  Only  fourteen 
regulations (29 percent) used an executive summary to present 
tables of qualitative or quantitative estimates of benefits and 
costs.  Although  many  of  the  other  RIAs  contained  such 
information,  it was not readily accessible.  4s RIAs often  bury 
specific economic information within a  technical discussion of 
the health or environmental impacts, making it difficult to find 
a  specific piece of information.  ¢  Although some criticize the 
Federal Register notices for poor presentation of information, it 
is easier to navigate and offers information in a more uniform, 
accessible format than RIAs.  47 
F.  Consistent Use of  Analytical Assumptions 
Agencies  of[en  failed  to  use  consistent  analytical 
assumptions, the use of which would ensure that agencies are 
comparing and presenting consistent results. Only ten out of 
forty-eight  rules  used  a  consistent  dollar  year,  a  consistent 
discount rate, and a  consistent estimate of benefits and costs. 
On a  more positive note, almost three-fourths of the analyses 
used  a  consistent  discount  rate  for  costs  and  benefits,  a 
generally  accepted  practice  that  permits  the  conversion  of 
future  benefits  and  costs  into  an  equivalent  present  dollar 
value. Of the RIAs that  relied on  a  single discount rate, 86 
percent  used  the  rate  of  7  percent  specified  in  the  OMB 
44. Although such inconsistencies  may reflect new information used in the 
analysis, the agencies  made no attempt to explain them. 
45. Several of the thirty-four regulations lacking data tobies in the executive 
summary did, nevertheless, present their results in an useful format, albeit less 
accessible. 
46. Often, rules describe basic economic concepts such as discounting and 
nonmarket valuation.  Although such  descriptions may  be  essential for  an 
understanding of the analysis, a lengthy discussion of techniques detracts from 
and obscures the  issues and  assumptions that are  unique  to  an individual 
analysis.  Instead, the agencies should simply refer to OMB guidelines that 
address those more general  concerns. 
47. See Hahn, Regulatory Accountability, supra note 6,  at 16  (describing the 
content and accessibility  of information  in the Federal  Regzster). No. 3]  Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses  877 
guidelines, 14 percent used a discount rate less than 7 percent 
and only one used a discount rate greater than 7 percent.  4a 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The agencies' economic analyses generally did not provide 
adequate information about a  proposed regulation to justify 
decisions  to  proceed  with  the  regulation.  The  absence  of 
information on  net  benefits  suggests strongly that  agencies 
largely have ignored the goal of the Executive Order and the 
OMB Guidelines.  An agency's RIA should be the starting point 
for serious policy analysis rather than the end, and the agency 
should  provide  the  results  in  a  consistent  and  transparent 
manner.  Even if the agency complies with the Executive Order 
and the OMB  Guidelines, a  deeper issue of assessing quality 
remains to be addressed. 
The  study  did  not  directly  measure  the  quality  of  the 
underlying analysis because it would have required knowledge 
of specific  technical issues.  Case studies by scholars suggest, 
however, that many RIAs suffer from serious shortcomings.  49 
A  low  score  on  the  regulatory  scorecard  is,  however,  an 
indicator of a  potentially poor quality analysis, particularly if 
the agency did not assess key economic variables, such as the 
net benefits of a regulation.  In addition, a high score using our 
criteria does not necessarily mean that the agency performed a 
high quality analysis because the agency could mask analytical 
flaws even if it  complies with the  Executive Order  and  the 
OMB Guidelines. 
An agency's RIA could receive a low score for the following 
three reasons: first, the agency may face resource constraints; 
second, the agency does not want interested parties to know 
that the benefits of the regulation may not justify the costs; and 
third,  the agency simply does not take the RIA requirement 
48. One 1-H-IS rule used a discount rate of 10 percent.  See Medical  Devices; 
Current  Good  Manulacturmg  Practice  (CGMP)  Final  Rule;  Quality  System 
Regulation,  61 Fed. Reg. 52,602, 52,646 (1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 808, 812, 
and 820). 
49. Scholars  also point  out that some  economic  analyses  are of high analytical 
quality. See. e.g, Hal'n,  Regulatory  Reform, supra note 4, at 240-41; Morgenstern  & 
Landy, supra note 4, at 463-74; RANDALL LUTIER, AN ANALYSIS  OF THE EPA'S 
PROPOSED LEAD HAZARD  STANDARDS  FOR HOMES 3, 12-15 (AEI-Brookings  Joint 
Center  for  Regulatory  Studies  Working  Paper  99-5, 1999)(discussing  the 
shortcomings of the EPA s econormc  analysis  of homeowner behavior, possible 
premature housing abandonment, and discounting future benefits). 878  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Voi. 23 
seriously because it is not enforced.  A  complete discussion of 
options for improving regulatory analysis and the regulatory 
process  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  5°  Nevertheless, 
several  recommendations  flow  naturally  from  our  analysis. 
These include: 
requiring an agency to calculate net benefits when it can 
estimate benefits and costs; and asking that agency to note 
the limitations  of those estimates; 
requiring an  agency to  present  both  best  estimates and 
ranges for benefits, costs, and net benefits; or, alternatively, 
asking an agency to justify why that cannot be done; 
requiring an agency to quantify any benefits or costs that it 
is unable or unwiUing to monetize; or, alternatively, asking 
that agency to justify why that cannot be done; 
requiring  an  agency  to  expand  its  consideration  of 
alternatives; 
requiring a clear executive summary along with a table that 
summarizes what is known about the likely benefits and 
costs of the regulation in a standard format; 
requiring RIAs to have a consistent format so that it is easier 
to  obtain  information from  different  RIAs  and  compare 
them; 
requiring that an RIA and supporting documents be posted 
on  the  Internet  so  that  such  analyses  are  more  easily 
obtained by interested parties; end 
requiring OMB to provide clearer guidance on how cost- 
effectiveness numbers should be presented and calculated to 
avoid some of the current problems. 
Forcing agencies to adhere to such standards poses a  critical 
challenge.  President Clinton, working with OMB, apparently 
has  not  been  successful  in  implementing  such  reforms, 
probably  due  to  a  lack of  interest and  willingness to  spend 
50. See, e.g.,  Ridmrd H. l~Ides &  ~  It Suz~tein, Relnventlng the Rel~la:o  ~ 
State, 62 U. CHL L  F~V. I, 8 (1995) ~mp~slng  methods of "simultaneously 
~'omoling economic and democratic_  ~goals" through regulaUon);  see genend/y 
51~eri1~ G.  BREed, BREAKING  TH~ VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD ~  RISK 
REGULATION ix  (1993) (prowding  political and  insUtutional analysis of  the 
"problems with the present regulatory system");  ROGER  G. NOt.L, THE ECONOMICS 
AND POLITICS  OF THE SLOWDOWN Ilq REGULATORY  REFORM (1999) (concluding that 
economic analysls.,  can be influential in promotlng,  regulatory.,, reform only when 
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political capital,  sl  Such reforms likely may prove worthwhile, 
not  necessarily  because  the  analysis  itself  will  improve 
dramatically, but rather  because  these  reforms  will enhance 
transparency in the regulatory process. 
Congress  could  pass  a  bill  that  incorporates  these 
suggestions.  It  could  also  give  OMB  greater  enforcement 
authority and create an agency outside the executive branch to 
report on how such guidelines are being implemented and to 
review  regulations,  s2  This  analysis  recognizes  the  lack  of 
political enthusiasm for making the process more transparent. 
At the same time, this issue could have some bipartisan appeal 
because it arguably would hold regulators more  accountable 
for their policies, and more accountable to Congress. 
Making the regulatory process more transparent will serve 
two  purposes.  First,  it  will  give  interested  parties  greater 
access to a key part of the regulatory process used to support a 
decision.  Second, it will increase the probability that scholars 
will engage in independent regulatory analysis that could lead 
to improvements in both the regulatory process and regulatory 
outcomes. 
APPENDIX  1 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS SCORECARD  A 
General Information 
Regulation Name: 
Agency and Department:.  Date: 
RIN#:  Status: final interim-final  page 
Economically  Significant: yes no page  Transfer Rule: yes no page 
51. Although the Clinton admintstzation  may deserve some blame, the problem 
was also relevant in earlier Republican administrations. Previous studies would 
suggest that economic analyses of regulations bY agencies were not necessarily 
better during the Bush andReagan administrations. See HAHN,  A~e~tNG THE 
GOVERNMENT'S NUMBERS,  supra note 6, at 9; Morgenstern & Landy, supr~  note 4, 
at 463-74.  Indeed, most presidents  may be unwilling to spendthe necessary 
capital to improve the quality of analysis. 
52. For example, Congress could say that OMB should not generally make a 
decision on a proposed regulation unless the economic analysis satisfied certain 
guidelines. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork 
Reduction of the House Comm. on Small Business (2000) (stetemer,  t of Robert W. 
Hahn & Robert E. L/tan, Directors, AEI-Brookings  Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies) (vzsited  June 7, 2000) <http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/ 
testimony/testimony_00_01.pdf>. Score  Pa~e  Notes 
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lde~ntified  Discount Rate 
Used a Consistent Discount Rate 
Idemtified Baseline for Costs 
Identified Baseline for Benefits 
Used Consistent Baseline for Costs and Benefits 
Identified Dollar Year 
Used Consistent Dollar Year 
Performed  Sensitivity  Analysis 
Gave Executive Sununm  7 
RIA is Available  on the Intemet 
The RIA was Peer-Reviewed 
Presented  Best Estimate of Net Benefits 
880 
Presented  Range of Net Benefits 
Presented  Best Estimate of Cost-Effectiveness 
Presented  Range of Cost-Effectiveness 
Discussed  Alternatives 
Quantified Costs and Benefits of Alternatives 
Quantified incremental Net Benefits of Alternatives 
Costs  Agency  Agency Agency 
States  Quanti- Mone- 
Exist  fled  tized 
S  P  S  P  S  P 
Private Sector Producer Compliance Costs  f  r  r 
Federal Budgetary Costs  ,  ,  , 
i  Local and/or State Government Costs  ,  I  , 
Other Costs 
I  I  I 
Presented  Range of Cost Estimates  ,  ,  , 
Presented  Best Estimate of Costs 
Presented Consistent Cost Figures B/t RIA and 
, FederaIRe~ster  ,  , 
s-score;p-page 
• For a complete copy of this scorecard,  including the factors  analyzed for 
an agency's treatment  of cost savings"  benefits,  uncertainty  and bias,  see 
<http: / / www.aei.brooldngs.org>. No. 3]  Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses  881 
APPENDIX 2 
LIST OF FINAL REGULATIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS* 
Agency Depart  RIN  Regulation title  Page Numbers in  Date of 




NOAA  0648-AJ58  Magnuson-Stevens Act  Vol. 63 pg 24212-  5/1/1998 
provmions; National  24237 
Standard Gmdelines 
~2~':II'~II-L-I-  iL  __~  ii  -'~/I-'--  ' 
ECPCP  1904-  Energy Conservation  Vol. 62 pg 50122-  9/24/1997 
AA38  Program for Consumer  50150 
Products; Conservation 
Standards for Room Air 
Conditioners 
'ECPCP  '1904-  EnergyConservatton  'Vol. 62pg23102-  '4/28/1997  ' 




OSHA  1218-  Respirctory Protection  Vol. 63 pg 1152-1200  1/28/1998 
,AA05 
'OSHA  1218-  'OccupationalExposure  'Vol 62ps1493-1619  '1/10/1997 
AA98  to Methylene Chloride 
'OSHA  ' 1218-  'Powered Industrial Truck'Vol. 63 pg 66238-  '12/1/1998 
AB33  Operator Training  66274 
FHWA  2125-  Parts and Accessories  Vol. 64 pg 15588-  3/31/1999 
AD27  Necessary for Safe  15606 
Operatton; lighting 
devices, reflectors, and 
,elecmcal eqmpment 
'FRA  '2130-  Roadway Worker  'Vol 61 pg 65959-  '12/16/1996' 
,AA86  ,Protection  65983 
'NHTSA  2127-  Federal Motor Vehicle  Vol. 64 pg 10786-  '3/5/1999 
AG50  Safety Standards; Chtid  10850 
Restraint Anchorage 
Systems, Chtid Restraint 
, Systems 
NHTSA '2127-  Federal Motor Vehicle  'Vol. 62 pg 12960-  '3/19/1997 
AG59  Safety Standards;  12975 
Occupant Crash 
PmtocUon (Alrbag 
,Depowenn~) 882  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 23 
NHTSA H27-  Incentive Grants for Use  Vol. 63 P8 57904-  10/2911998 
[  M-138  )fSeat Belts, Allocation  5791 ] 
:  3ased on State Seat Belt 
;  Jse Rates 
NHTSA =  H27-  ' 3peratlon of Motor  iVoL 64 pg 35568-  111111999  ' 
atH39  Vehicles by Intoxicated  35573 
?ersons 
OAR  2060-  ~Standsrds  of  Vol. 62 pg 48347-  111511997 
AC62  !Performance for New  4839l 
iStefionary Sources and 
;Em/ssmn Guldelmes for 
Hospital/medical/in fect m 
us Waste Incinexators  ] 
iOAR  '2060-  Emlsslon Standards for  Vol 63 Pg 18978-  t/16/1998 
AD33  LocomoUves and  19084 
jL°c°m°tlve En~mes  ,  ,  , 
JOAR  2060-AE27  Final Regulatmns for  Vol. 61 pg 5485]-  I0/22/1996 
Revisions to the Federal  54906 
Test Procedure for 
Emissions from Motor 
Valucles 
l  l  l  i  l 
'OAR  2060-AE54  New Gasoline Spark  Vol. 61 P8 52087-  10/4/1996 
Igmtmn and  52]69 
Compression-lgnition 
Marine Engines, New 
Non-Road Compressmn- 
Ignition Engines and 
Spark-lgnitmn engines, 
i Exempti°ns  i  , 




Performance for  49455 
Nitrogen Oxide 
Enusstons From New 
Fossil-Fual Fired Steam 
Generating Um~; 
Revisions to Reporting 
Reqmrementa for 
Standards of 
Performance for New 
Fossil-Fuel Fired Steam  i 
i  iGeneratin[~ Units  i  [ 
2060-AE57  National Ambient Air  Vol. 62 P8 38855-  7/18/1997 
Quality Standards for  38896 
I  iOzon~ Final Rule  ,  i 
2060-AE66  National Ambient Air  Vol. 62 ng 38652-  7/18/1997 
Quality Standards for  38760 
Ptutlculate Matter, Final 
Rule 
t2060-AF481Acid Rain, Phase If,  i Vo]. 61 P8 6711 i-  112/19/1996 
Nitrogen Oxides  $7164 
Emission Reduction 
Prosram No. 3]  Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses  883 
OAR  2060-AF75  "New Motor Vehmles and "Vol.  62 pg 3119|-  "6/6/1997 
New Motor Vehicle  31270 
Engines Air PolluUon 
Control: Voluntary 
:$tendsrds  for Light-duty 
,  ~  , Vehiclea  i Final Rule  , 
3AR  2060-AF76  ~ontrolofEmissionsof  Vo|  62p854693-  '10/'21/1997' 
Atr Pollutton from  54730 
~hghway Heavy-duty 
,  i  ,Entries  ,  I 
EIAR  1060-  RegulationofFuelsand  Voi.  61p835309-  !7/5/1996  t 
~.G06  Fuel Additives:  3538  I 
Certification Standards 
for Deposit Control 
,  ,  , Gasoline Addiuves  , 
OAR  2060-  Findings  of Significant  Vol. 63 pg 57356-  ' 10/27/1998  t 
AHIO  Contribution  and  57538 
Rulemaking for Certain 
States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment 
Group Region for 
Proposes of Reducing 
,Trnnsporl of Ozone  ,  ,  , 
'OAR  '2060-AE29 Phase 2 Emission  Vol. 64 pg i5208  3/30/I 999 
Standards for New 
Nonrom/Spark-igmtion 
Nonhandheld Engines at 
ior below 19 ktlowatta  , 
'2060-AF32 Regmnal Haze  Vol. 64 pg 357|4-  1OAR 
f  I 




'7/I/1999  ' 
,RcRulauons  35763  ,  l 
Disposal of  Vot 63 pg 35384-  6/29/1998 
Polychlorlnated  35474 
,Blphenyls 
Financial Assurance  Vol. 6i pg 60327-  ' 11/2711996  ' 
Vlechamsms for Local  60339 
3overnment Owners and 
3perators of Municipal 
~ohd Waste Landfill 
i ~aCl]lties 
3SWER~  1050-  ~.ccldental  Ralease  'Vol. 61 pg 31667o  6/20/1996  t 
M)26  Prevenuon  31730 
Requirements: Rssk 
Management  Progrmns 
~der Clean Air Act 
,  ,Section 112(r){7)  , 
OSWER 2050-  Land Disposal  VoL 61 pg 15566-  ~-/8/1996 
AD38  Resmetlons Phase III;  t5596 
Decharactenzed 
W~tewaten,  Cedoamate 
Wastes, and Spent 
,Aluminum Potliners  i 
TSCA  2070-  Lead; Requirements for  VoL 61 pg 45777-  i B/29/1996 
AC64  Lead-Based  Paint  t5830 
Aetivmes in Target 
Housing and Child- 
,Occupied Facilities 884  Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy 








FDA  0910- 
AA09 
IFDA  10910  - 
AAI9 
IFDA  10910- 
AA24 
IFDA  10910- 
AA43 
i 
IFDA  Jl)910- 
AA48 
I'~'DA  13910  . 
etA91 
IFDA  10910- 
AB20 
[Vol.  23 
'Addiuon of Facflnties in  "Vol. 62 pg 23834-  5/111997 
Certain Industry Sectors,  23892 
Toxic Chemncal Release 
Rcpomng, Community 
I  Rsf~ht'l°-Kn°w  I 
Nauomti Emi~slons  Vol. 63 pg 18504-  4/1511998 
Standards for Hazardom  18751 
Air Pollutants for Source i 
Category: Pulp and paper[ 
Pmductm~  Effluent  , 
Limitations Gmdelmes, 
Pretreatment Standards, 
und  New Source 
Performance Standards: 
' Pulp, Paper, and 
Papedooa~  Cate.~ovy  I  I 
INattonal  Primary  VoL 63 pg 69390-  12/16/1998 
Drinking Water  ~9476 
Regulations: 
Dtsmfectants  and 
D sinfection Byproducts  I 
. INational Primary  Vol. 63 Pg 69477-  12/1  6/1998 
E)rmkin  8 Water  69521 
~¢gulations: Interim 
Enhanced Surface Water 
Treatment 
Medical Device.s:  CGMP  Vol. 61 pg 52601-  10/7/I 996 
Quality Systenks  52662 
Rel~ulati°n  I 
IFood Labehng NulnUon  Vo. 61 pg40963-  8/7/1996 
Labeling, Small Business  40981 
I  Exempti°n  I  I 
Quahty Mammography  Vo,  62 pg 55851°  10/28/1997 
Standards  55994  I  I 
IFood Labeling: Warning  Vo. 63 pg 37030-  7/8/1998 
and Label Statement,  37056 
Labeling of Juice  [ 
Products  I 
IRegulaoons Resmctln 8  Vo. 61 pg 44395-  8/28/1996 
the Sale and D/stnbution  14618 
of  Cigare/les and 
Smokeless Tobacco  to 
Protect Children and 
I  Adolescents  I 
8ubetence3 Prohibited  !Vol. 62 pg 30935-  15/511997 
Prom Use in Animal  30978 
~'ocd or Feed; Animal 
~roteins Prohibited m 
I ~,uminant Feed 
2esulation Requiting  Vo. 63 pg 66632- 
Manufacturers to Assess  66672 
the Safety and 
Effectiveness of New 
Drugs. Biological 
Products in Pediatric 
,Patients  i 
i 
12/2/1998 
I  I No. 3]  Assessing  Regulatory Impact Analyses  885 
HCFA  0938-A195  Medicare and Medicaid  Vol. 63 P8 33856-  6/22/1998 
programs: Hospital  33875 
Conditions of 
Psrtteipation 
Identtfication of Potential 
Organ Tissue, and Eye 
Donors and Transplant 
Hospitals' Proviston of 
,Transplant-Related Data  , 
i 
'HCFA  '0938-A117  Newborns' and Mothers'  Vol. 63pg$7546-  10/27/1998 
Health Protection Act  57564 
'HSRA  '0910-  'Organ Procu~ment and  'Vol. 63ps16296-  '4/2/1998 
AA32  Transplantation Network  16338 
APHIS  0579-  Solid Wood Packing  Vol. 61 pg 50099-  9/18/1998 
AB01  Material From China  50111 
'APHIS  ~0583-  'Pathogen Reduction:  'VoL 61 pg 38805-  '7/25/1996 
AB69  Hazard Analysis and  38956 
CtiUcal Control Points 
I  I  I  I 
+ For the full text of these rules, see <http://www.aei.brookings.org>.  The 
rules cart also be found  at National  Archives and Records  Administration, 
Federal  Reg~ter  Online  via  GPO  Access  (vtsited  .June  7,  2000) 
<http://www.access.b, po Soy/su_docs/aces/acesl40.html>. 